



---

**Regional Conference on Population and Development in the Arab States  
Development Challenges and Population Dynamics in a Changing Arab World**

**ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN  
THE ARAB REGION**

**Ayman Zohry, Ph.D.**

**Cairo, 24-26 June 2013**

## Table of Contents

Executive Summary .....	iii
I. INTRODUCTION .....	1
A. International Migration in the ICMD Programme of Action .....	1
B. Data and Methods .....	2
II. LEVELS AND TRENDS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION.....	4
A. Stock of International migrants in the Arab Region.....	4
B. Causes of Migration.....	7
C. Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics of Migrants .....	9
D. International Migration Corridors .....	19
E. Refugees in the Arab Region.....	25
F. Demographic Impact of International Migration .....	29
G. Female Migration .....	32
III. MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT .....	35
A. Remittances .....	35
B. Skill Transfer .....	43
C. Migration and the MDGs .....	44
IV. MIGRATION POLICIES.....	46
A. Summary of State Policies .....	46
B. Nationalization of the Labor force and Migration .....	51
C. Regional and International Cooperation on Migration .....	52
D. Migrants Rights and Protection .....	57
E. Migration and the Arab Uprising .....	58
V. POLICY DIRECTIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD .....	60
A. Remittances .....	60
B. Diaspora Engagement .....	60
C. Migrants' Rights .....	61
D. Nationalization, Population, and the Demographic Deficit .....	62
E. Regional Cooperation.....	62
F. International Cooperation .....	63
G. Data Collection.....	63
References.....	64

## **Executive Summary**

This study reviews recent situation of international migration in the Arab. It focuses primarily on voluntary migration from (emigration), to (immigration), and through the Arab Region (transit migration). The study also explores the interrelationships between migration and development and documents the views and policies, regional, and international cooperation relating international migration and human mobility in the region.

As for the level and trends of international migration in the Arab Region, one can notice that this region is a sending, receiving, as well as a transit region. As a sending region, two migration streams can be identified; migration within the region to the GCC states and migration from the region to industrialized countries with two main streams, one stream from North Africa to Europe and another stream from different countries in the region to North America and Oceania. Migrants to the region mainly target the GCC states. The GCC states host the vast majority of international migrants in the Arab Region. Non-citizens in some GCC states comprise more than 80% of the total population.

The relationships between migration and development are usually explored through assessing the impact of migrants' remittances. Due to the fact that the Arab region is a sending as well as a receiving region, the Arab region is one of the major sending and receiving region worldwide. The main remittance sending countries are the main migrants receiving countries; the GCC states. The GCC states' outward remittances in 2011 amounted for about 73US\$ billion. With respect to inward remittance, major receiving countries in the Arab region received more than 43US\$ billion in 2011. In addition, remittances comprise a significant percent compared to the GDP of some remittance receiving countries in the region. Despite the high amount of remittances received by Arab countries, most of remittances are used in household consumption and immediate needs of remittance receiving families.

Due to the diversity of migration streams in the region, migration policies vary from country to another. However, receiving countries in the GCC are seeking to reduce dependence on expatriate labor and working hard to replace expatriates with national employment through naturalization programs. However, in light of the demographic deficit and the economic expansion witnessed in the GCC sub-region, the outcomes of the naturalization policies and programmes are not expected to make a big difference in the labor market. Sending countries regard migration as an asset to their economies and generally encourage migration.

With respect to policy direction, due to the multifaceted migration streams in the Arab region and the complexity and diversity of socio-economic and demographic situation, a comprehensive policy on international migration is quit difficult to exist in the short run. Instead, thematic and sub-regional policies may lead to a comprehensive policy in the long run. A summary of policy directions is outlined below:

### **Remittances**

Arab countries should introduce/develop policies and national economic incentives to encourage migrants to invest their remittances in their home countries through tax exemptions of migrants' projects, the expansion of access to financial services, and promoting collective remittances and developing programs to engage expatriates in local development.

### **Diaspora Engagement**

Arab countries should maximize the benefits of their national expatriates by engaging them in the development of their origin and set measures to boost their engagement and linking the highly-skilled migrants to their appropriate national institutions.

### **Migrants' Rights**

The GCC states are urged to abolish the *kafala* system and develop another human rights-friendly mechanism to fulfill their needs of labor force. In addition, these countries should intensify their efforts to combat trading on visas.

### **Nationalization Programmes**

The GCC states should recognize the ceiling of their efforts aiming at naturalizing their labor force and set realistic programs that recognize the mismatching between their expanding economic activities and the available national labor force.

### **Regional Cooperation**

Despite the long list of agreements, declarations, and regional conventions that cover all aspects of human mobility in the region, the Arab region lacks a regional consultative mechanism that includes all Arab countries in order to formulate a comprehensive and integrated Arab strategy that makes for maximizing the benefits of migration and minimize its hazards and strengthens the position of Arab states in negotiating migration issues regionally and globally.

### **International Cooperation**

Europe is the major receiving country of Arab migration while South and South East Asia is the Major sending region to the Arab Region. Cooperation with the two regions is guided mainly by the Colombo Process and the Abu Dhabi Declaration in the case of South and South East Asia, and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the case of Europe. However, more effort is needed in order to urge the European partners to strengthen legal migration channels and to boost cooperation on training of potential migrants from the region. As for the cooperation with South and South East Asian countries, the GCC states are urged to strengthen their ties with this important sending region and develop the appropriate mechanisms to strengthen the four areas of partnership agreed-upon in the Abu Dhabi Declaration.

### **Data Collection**

Due to the lack of comparable data on international migration in the Arab region, it is highly recommended to make available comprehensive and up-to-date data on various dimensions of Arab migration by Arab countries through comprehensive mechanisms for

collecting, analyzing, classifying, tabulating, and updating data on international migration in the Arab region.

## I. INTRODUCTION

“The role that migrants play in promoting development and poverty reduction in countries of origin, as well as the contribution they make towards the prosperity of destination countries, should be recognized and reinforced” (Global Commission on International Migration, 2005: 23). International migration has always been considered a demographic and socio-economic phenomenon, which is affected by both internal and external factors. The most important among these factors is the labour market at the international level and the political conditions in both sending and receiving countries (Choucri 1999). This study reviews recent situation of international migration in the Arab. It focuses primarily on voluntary migration from (emigration), to (immigration), and through the Arab Region (transit migration). The study also explores the interrelationships between migration and development and documents the views and policies, regional, and international cooperation relating international migration and human mobility in the region.

### *A. International Migration in the ICMD Programme of Action*

The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) Programme of Action (POA) re-assessed the interrelationship between migration and developments and urged governments to address the root causes of migration, to make remaining in one's country a viable option for all people and the exchange of information on migration policies and the monitoring of stocks and flows of migrants through adequate data gathering should be supported. Regarding documented migrants, the POA urged countries to consider extending to documented migrants who meet appropriate length-of-stay requirements, and to members of their families, regular treatment equal to that accorded their own nationals with regard to basic human rights. In addition, the POA recommends actions to reduce the number of undocumented migrants; prevent their exploitation and protect their basic human rights; prevent international trafficking in migrants; and protect them against racism, ethnocentrism and xenophobia.

Regarding Refugees, asylum-seekers and displaced persons, the POA urged governments to address the root causes of movements of refugees and displaced persons by taking appropriate measures with respect to the resolution of conflict, the promotion of peace and reconciliation, respect for human rights, and respect for independence, territorial integrity and the sovereignty of States. Moreover, the POA urged governments to address the factors that contribute to forced displacement and strengthen their support for international activities to protect and assist refugees and displaced persons.

With respect to the interrelationships between migration and development, the POA recommends that the Inflows of remittances should be fostered by sound economic policies and adequate banking facilities. Countries of destination should consider the use of temporary migration, while countries of origin should collaborate in promoting voluntary return. The exchange of information on migration policies and the monitoring of stocks and flows of migrants through adequate data gathering should be supported.

### ***B. Data and Methods***

Due to the differences between national estimates and available international comparable data, this report depends mainly on comparable data provided by the United Nations' international migration stock database and the World Bank's migration and remittances data. The problem of data availability, the absence of accurate data, and the discrepancies of data by different sources and different time references of the available data are major challenges this study faces.



## International Migration: ICMPD Programme of Action

International economic, political and cultural interrelations play an important role in determining the flow of people between countries. In its diverse types, international migration is linked to such interrelations and both affects and is affected by the development process. Poverty and environmental degradation, combined with the absence of peace and security, and human rights violations are all factors affecting international migration.

*A. International migration and development.* Orderly international migration can have positive effects on both communities of origin and those of destination. Governments are urged to address the root causes of migration, to make remaining in one's country a viable option for all people. Inflows of remittances should be fostered by sound economic policies and adequate banking facilities. Countries of destination should consider the use of temporary migration, while countries of origin should collaborate in promoting voluntary return. The exchange of information on migration policies and the monitoring of stocks and flows of migrants through adequate data gathering should be supported.

*B. Documented migrants.* Governments of receiving countries are urged to consider extending to documented migrants who meet appropriate length-of-stay requirements, and to members of their families, regular treatment equal to that accorded their own nationals with regard to basic human rights. Women and children who migrate as family members should be protected from abuse or denial of their human rights. All Governments, particularly those of receiving countries, must recognize the vital importance of family reunification and promote its integration into their national legislation in order to protect the unity of the families of documented migrants in a manner consistent with the universally recognized human rights instruments.

*C. Undocumented migrants.* The document recalls the right of every nation State to decide who can enter and stay in its territory and under what conditions, and urges Governments to exercise such right taking care to avoid racist or xenophobic actions and policies. Section C recommends actions to reduce the number of undocumented migrants; prevent their exploitation and protect their basic human rights; prevent international trafficking in migrants; and protect them against racism, ethnocentrism and xenophobia. These actions include identifying the causes of undocumented migration and its economic, social and demographic impact; adopting effective sanctions against those who organize, exploit or traffic in undocumented migration; deterring undocumented migration by making potential migrants aware of the legal conditions for entry, stay and employment in host countries; and trying to find solutions to the problems of undocumented migrants through bilateral or multilateral negotiations on, *inter alia*, readmission agreements that protect the basic human rights of persons involved in accordance with relevant international instruments.

*D. Refugees, asylum-seekers and displaced persons.* Governments are urged to address the root causes of movements of refugees and displaced persons by taking appropriate measures with respect to the resolution of conflict, the promotion of peace and reconciliation, respect for human rights, and respect for independence, territorial integrity and the sovereignty of States. Governments should also address the factors that contribute to forced displacement and strengthen their support for international activities to protect and assist refugees and displaced persons. Adequate international support should be extended to countries of asylum to meet the basic needs of refugees and to assist in the search for durable solutions. Refugees should be provided with access to adequate accommodation; education; health services, including family planning; and other necessary social services.

**Source: United Nations (1995) ICPD Programme of Action, United Nations, New York**

## **II. LEVELS AND TRENDS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION**

The Arab Region has experienced diverse migration flows. The Maghreb sub-region has been an important source of migration to Europe in addition to being itself a destination sub-region for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and neighboring countries. The Mashreq sub-region has mostly been a sub-region of origin for workers migration to the GCC countries as well as being a destination sub-region. The GCC countries are among the major destination of migrant workers worldwide (United Nations 2006). Migration stock in the Arab region increased from 15.5 million in 1990 to 25.8 million in 2010 representing about 12% of total migrants worldwide in 2010.

### ***A. Stock of International migrants in the Arab Region***

Major receiving countries in the Arab region host more than 23 million international migrant representing about 11% of the total number of international migrants worldwide (out of 214 international migrants in 2010). The GCC countries host about two-third of international migrants in the Arab region. International migration stock in the Arab region represents a mixture of refugees, transit migrants, and economic migrants.

#### **Mashreq:**

The Arab Mashreq sub-region hosts about 8.2 million international migrants representing 31.7% of the total international migrants in the Arab region. Most of international migrants in Syria are Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. International migrants in Jordan and Lebanon are a mixture of Palestinian, Iraqi, Syrian refugees as well as economic migrants, mainly from Egypt and South and South East Asia. Data on international migration in the State of Palestine include Palestinian refugees and Israeli settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In 2010, the number of settlers was estimated at 520 thousand; 200 thousand in East Jerusalem and 320 thousand in the West Bank (The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2013). In addition, Egypt hosts about 245 thousand migrants most of them are refugees and transit migrants coming from Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Maghreb:**

Except for Libya, the Arab Mashreq sub-region is a sending sub-region. Maghreb sub-region hosts about 1.1 million international migrant representing 4.3% of the total international migrants in the Arab Region. Libya hosts about 0.7 million representing 61.7% of total international migrants in the Maghreb. In the last two decades, most of migrants to Libya were coming from Egypt, Tunisia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Libya is not only a country of destination, but also a transit country. Due to its geographical proximity, many migrants regard Libya as a gate to Europe

**The GCC Countries:**

The GCC sub-region is a major pull of international migration in the Arab region. International migrants in the GCC countries increased from 8.6 million in 1990 to 15.1 million in 2010. International migration to the GCC countries is mainly economic; the demographic deficit in this region and the economic development steamed by oil revenues made the region a pull for foreign labor. Saudi Arabia is considered the major host country for foreign labor in the GCC with about 7.3 million international migrants represent 48.2% of the total migrants in the GCC region followed by the United Arab Emirates with about 3.3 million international migrants representing 21.8% of the region, and Kuwait with about 2.1 million international migrants representing 13.9% of international migrants in the region

**Southern Tier Countries:**

The Southern Tier Countries include Comoros, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. The stock of international migrants in the southern Tier Countries in 2010 was about 1.4 million which comprises 5.5% of the total international migrants in the Arab region. Most of international migrants in this sub-region are concentrated in Sudan and Yemen. Most of international migrants in these two countries are refugees and transit migrants (See Table 1).

**Table 1**  
**Stock of International Migrants in the Arab Region by Sub-region and Country**  
**(1990-2010)**

Sub-region/ Country	Year					Percent within Sub- Region	Total Percent
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010		
<b>Mashreq</b>							
Egypt	175,574	174,301	169,149	246,745	244,714	3.0	0.9
Iraq	83,638	133,733	146,910	128,115	83,380	1.0	0.3
Jordan	1,146,349	1,607,661	1,927,845	2,345,235	2,972,983	36.3	11.5
Lebanon	523,693	655,832	692,913	721,191	758,167	9.3	2.9
Palestine*	910,637	1,200,972	1,407,631	1,660,576	1,923,808	23.5	7.4
Syria	690,349	816,799	924,086	1,326,359	2,205,847	26.9	8.5
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>3,530,240</b>	<b>4,589,298</b>	<b>5,268,534</b>	<b>6,428,221</b>	<b>8,188,899</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>31.7</b>
<b>Maghreb</b>							
Algeria	273,954	298,874	250,110	242,446	242,324	21.9	0.9
Libya	457,482	505,596	558,770	617,536	682,482	61.7	2.6
Morocco	57,597	55,315	53,124	51,020	49,098	4.4	0.2
Tunisia	37,986	37,612	36,221	34,881	33,591	3.0	0.1
Mauritania	93,878	117,580	62,593	66,053	99,229	9.0	0.4
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>920,897</b>	<b>1,014,977</b>	<b>960,818</b>	<b>1,011,936</b>	<b>1,106,724</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4.3</b>
<b>GCC</b>							
Bahrain	173,200	205,977	239,366	278,166	315,403	2.1	1.2
Kuwait	1,585,280	1,089,545	1,500,442	1,869,665	2,097,527	13.9	8.1
Oman	423,572	582,463	623,608	666,263	826,074	5.5	3.2
Qatar	369,816	405,915	470,731	712,861	1,305,428	8.6	5.1
Saudi Arabia	4,742,997	4,610,694	5,136,402	6,336,666	7,288,900	48.2	28.2
UAE	1,330,324	1,715,980	2,286,174	2,863,027	3,293,264	21.8	12.7
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>8,625,189</b>	<b>8,610,574</b>	<b>10,256,723</b>	<b>12,726,648</b>	<b>15,126,596</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>58.5</b>
<b>Southern Tier</b>							
Comoros	14,079	13,938	13,799	13,661	13,525	1.0	0.1
Djibouti	122,221	105,192	110,201	110,333	114,147	8.0	0.4
Somalia	633,109	18,644	19,873	21,271	22,843	1.6	0.1
Sudan	1,273,141	1,111,143	853,867	639,686	753,447	53.0	2.9
Yemen	343,509	377,914	413,530	455,230	517,926	36.4	2.0
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>2,386,059</b>	<b>1,626,831</b>	<b>1,411,270</b>	<b>1,240,181</b>	<b>1,421,888</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>5.5</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>15,462,385</b>	<b>15,841,680</b>	<b>17,897,345</b>	<b>21,406,986</b>	<b>25,844,107</b>		<b>100.0</b>

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008).

\* The number for Palestine includes Israeli settlers who are not migrants in and by any definition

## **B. Causes of Migration**

The Arab region witnesses two types of human mobility; voluntary and forced migration. As for the voluntary mobility, it's mainly economic. Forced migration is mainly attributed to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in addition to the civil wars and political unrest in Somalia and the Sudan and the recent conflict in Syria in addition to other causes such as environmental factors. Forced migration in the region is explored in a separate sub-section in this study. Hence, this sub-section is devoted to the causes of voluntary migration in the region.

### **Migration within and to the Arab Region:**

The main cause of migration to the region is overwhelmingly economic. The economic boom in the Oil-producing countries in the 1970s and the ambitious development plans have been associated with the demographic deficit in these countries and the demographic surplus in other sub-regions made for establishing a strong migration stream from the Arab region and South and South East Asia targeting the oil-producing countries in the Gulf in addition to Libya. Later on, Jordan became a major destination of semi-skilled workers, mainly from Egypt and Syria. In addition to the GCC countries, Libya, and Jordan, Iraq was also an important recipient of migrants prior the occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Unemployment in the sending countries can be regarded as the main reason of emigration. In addition to unemployment, income disparities between sending and receiving countries is another cause of migration (Zohry, 2006).

In addition to economic factors, the current Arab uprising has had an immediate impact on international migration in the region as reflected in the return migration for Libya, border crossing from Syria to neighboring countries, and the slight rise in irregular migration for Tunisia right after the revolution. The current economic and political conditions in Egypt and Tunisia and the political sharp divide between the political Islam parties and liberal parties in addition to other forces in the society may lead to an increasing desire for migration especially among the employees of most affected economic sectors such as tourism and fresh graduates in addition to the decrease of the Direct Foreign Investment flow.

### **Migration from the Arab Region:**

The main historical migration stream from the Arab Region to other regions was mainly motivated by colonial ties between the Maghreb countries and Europe. The Maghreb remains a “classic” area of emigration, most of it to Europe (Boubakri, 2004). Large-scale Arab migration to the developed countries began after the Second World War, with the Palestinians; followed by Egyptians and Sudanese coming for education and professional development, and the 1960s witnessed Moroccans seeking a better life or more political liberty than was found at homeland. Political conditions in the home countries has continued was a major reason for Arab migration, bringing in the decades spanning the 1960s to the 1990s, Iraqis, Egyptians, Sudanese, Algerians, and Somalis (Al-Jalili, 2004).

As for the current Arab migration stream to Europe, the reasons of migration differ according to country of origin. A field Study by Zohry (2009a) indicates that the recent Egyptian migration to Europe is a reproduction of the pattern of Egyptian migration to the Arab Gulf countries, where young males migrate to achieve specific financial goals and then they return to Egypt. Egyptian migration to Europe is different from other migration streams, especially the Maghreb countries. Egyptian migration to Europe is mainly male-dominated and temporary migration in general, while Maghreb migration streams are dominated by males and females who intend to stay in the destination countries in general. In addition, the skill level of Egyptian migrants in Europe is higher than that of migrants from the Maghreb countries.

To sum up, the main causes of migration to and from the region are multifaceted. Economic-wise, they are deeply-rooted in the economic structure of the sending and receiving countries, stimulated by the demographic deficit and the need for labor to match economic demand in receiving countries and high unemployment rates in sending economies, stimulated by economic ties and migration networks in the case of Maghreb, and lastly motivated by political instability in what is called the “Arab Spring” countries.

### ***C. Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics of Migrants***

Data on the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of migrants in the Arab region are scarce and often outdated. Contrary to migrants in the Arab region, comparative data on Arab migrants in the OECD countries are available through the OECD interactive database (OECD 2013). However, the OECD data refer to the year 2000.

#### **Migrants in the Arab region**

Migrants in the Arab region are mainly temporary contractual workers from other Arab and Asian countries to the GCC countries. Since comparable data are not available, the case of Qatar with somewhat detailed data is used in this analysis as a case study.

#### Migrants by age and sex:

The available data of non-Qatari employed population (15+) by age and sex indicates a young population structure of migrants with the total number of employed population less than 45 years old comprises 83.6% of the total employed migrant population. The age structure by sex indicates a similar age pattern for both males and females. However, it is noticed that almost 50% of females are in the age group 25-34. Employed migrants in the age group 55+ comprise a small percentage (only 3.5%).

#### Migrant workers by education and sex:

The available data indicate that most migrants in the Arab-receiving countries are males with low level of Education. Data extracted from Qatar Population Census 2010 presented in Table 3 below indicate that 89.3% of employed foreign workers are males; females comprise 10.7% of the total number of employed workers. As for the distribution of foreign workers by education, data indicate that most of migrants have less than university education; migrants with university education or more comprise 12.2% only. Females with university education or more comprise 21.2% compared to 11.1% only for males. The high percent of females with university education or more, compared to males, may be attributed, in part, to the high percent of males with less education who work mainly in male-dominated sectors such as the construction sector. The pattern of

migrants in Qatar can be safely expanded to cover all GCC countries with slight variations by country. The pattern of Qatar may be considered similar to those of the UAE and possibly Kuwait. However, there are differences in the functioning of the labor market, and hence in migration, with Bahrain and Oman.

**Table 2**  
**Percentage Distribution of Non Qatari employed population (15+)**  
**by Age and Sex, Qatar 2010**

Age Group	Sex		Total
	Males	Females	
15-24	13.5	11.8	13.3
25-34	38.9	49.3	40.0
35-44	30.8	26.0	30.3
45-54	13.2	10.7	12.9
55-64	3.3	2.0	3.2
65+	0.4	0.1	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	1,070,973	128,134	1,199,107

Source: compiled from Qatar Census 2010

**Table 3**  
**Percentage distribution of Employed Foreign Workers 15+ by Sex and Education,**  
**Qatar 2010**

Education	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
Illiterate	3.6	3.8	3.6
Read and Write	26.5	30.8	27.0
Primary	25.1	14.7	24.0
Preparatory	10.7	11.4	10.7
Vocational	2.1	0.2	1.9
Secondary	18.2	14.4	17.8
Post. Secondary	2.7	3.5	2.8
University+	11.1	21.2	12.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Percent	89.3	10.7	100.0

Source: compiled from Qatar Census 2010



### Migrants in the public and private sector:

The private sector of the GCC economy is the main employer of migrants. As indicated in Table 4 below, the percent of migrants in the private sector in Qatar and Kuwait comprise 99.0% and 97.8% respectively. In Saudi Arabia, migrants comprise about 90% of workers in the private sector. The lowest contribution of migrants in the private sector is observed in Bahrain (82.2%). Nationals prefer to work in the public sector because of high wages, job security, social allowances and retirement benefits (Kapiszewski, 2006)

**Table 4**  
**Percent of Migrants in the GCC countries by Sector, 2010**

Sector	Country				
	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia
Migrants in the Public Sector	12.2	26.4	14.4	56.1	7.8
Migrants in the Private Sector	82.2	97.8	84.3	99.0	89.6
<b>Total Migrants</b>	<b>76.6</b>	<b>88.0</b>	<b>76.0</b>	<b>93.7</b>	<b>79.8</b>

Source: Compiled from GCC Monthly Economic Review 2012

As a conclusion, migrants in the Arab region are mainly young males who work primarily in the private sector of the receiving countries. Their educational attainment is mainly below university.

### **Arab migrants abroad**

The OECD online database provides detailed data on migrants in the OECD countries. Data on Arab migrants are extracted from the OECD database shed light on their characteristics. Age-sex, educational composition, and unemployment rates among Arab migrants are explored below. However, one should bear in mind that the reference year of the OECD data presented below is 2000. The most recent available data don't detail the characteristics of migrants.

Arabs in the OECD by age and sex:

As shown in Table 5 below, Arab male migrants in the OECD countries comprise 55.6% of the total migrants. The percent of male migrants slightly varies by sending sub-regions and countries from 59.4% for migrants from the GCC countries to 54.6% for migrants from the Maghreb countries. With respect to data by country, it is noticed that male migrants comprise 75.2% for migrants from Mauritania while they comprise 47.9% for migrants from Somalia.

As for the age composition of Arab migrants in OECD countries, it is noticed that young migrants (15-24 years) comprise 10.9% of the total migrants, while migrants in the age group 25-64 comprise the major bulk of migrants (76.2%). Migrants 65+ years old comprise 12.8% of the total migrants. Sub-regional data indicate a high percent of young migrants from the GCC sub-region where migrants in the age group 15-24 comprise 47.8% of the total migrants from this sub-region, while migrants in the age group 25-64 comprise 51.3%. However, the absolute number of migrants from the GCC sub-region in the OECD is too small; they may be assumed to be students and trainees. Migrants from the Maghreb sub-region witnesses the lowest percent of young migrants with 8.6% of the total migrants in the age group 15-24 and the highest percent of migrants 65+ (14.5%). The age structure of migrants of the Maghreb sub-region may reflect the impact of cumulated migration to Europe.

**Table 5**  
**Percentage Distribution of Arab migrants in the OECD countries**  
**by Sex and Country of Birth (2000)**

Sub-region/ Country	Sex		
	Male	Female	Total
<b>Mashreq</b>			
Egypt	58.1	41.9	100.0
Iraq	62.1	37.9	100.0
Jordan	61.8	38.2	100.0
Lebanon	55.4	44.6	100.0
Palestine	63.5	36.5	100.0
Syria	56.5	43.5	100.0
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>41.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Maghreb</b>			
Algeria	52.4	47.6	100.0
Libya	52.9	47.1	100.0
Morocco	56.0	44.0	100.0
Tunisia	55.7	44.3	100.0
Mauritania	75.2	24.8	100.0
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>54.6</b>	<b>45.4</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>GCC</b>			
Bahrain	52.7	47.3	100.0
Kuwait	59.1	40.9	100.0
Oman	67.4	32.6	100.0
Qatar	60.2	39.8	100.0
Saudi Arabia	59.7	40.3	100.0
UAE	61.4	38.6	100.0
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>59.4</b>	<b>40.6</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Southern Tier</b>			
Comoros	51.3	48.7	100.0
Djibouti	51.5	48.5	100.0
Somalia	47.9	52.1	100.0
Sudan	60.4	39.6	100.0
Yemen	63.8	36.2	100.0
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>52.9</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>55.6</b>	<b>44.4</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Data extracted on 24 Mar 2013 11:07 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat

**Table 6**  
**Percentage Distribution of Arab migrants in the OECD countries**  
**by Broad Age Groups (2000)**

Country of birth	Age Group			All ages
	15-24	25-64	65+	
<b>Mashreq</b>				
Egypt	6.1	75.4	18.5	100.0
Iraq	17.1	77.7	5.2	100.0
Jordan	13.1	82.0	4.9	100.0
Lebanon	11.6	79.3	9.1	100.0
Palestine	7.8	74.3	17.9	100.0
Syria	10.7	77.4	11.9	100.0
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>11.7</b>	<b>77.7</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Maghreb</b>				
Algeria	4.2	73.4	22.4	100.0
Libya	8.4	75.4	16.2	100.0
Morocco	13.6	79.9	6.5	100.0
Tunisia	4.6	76.9	18.5	100.0
Mauritania	12.7	84.9	2.4	100.0
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>76.9</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>GCC</b>				
Bahrain	38.2	60.3	1.5	100.0
Kuwait	35.7	64.0	0.4	100.0
Oman	58.7	40.6	0.7	100.0
Qatar	46.1	52.4	1.6	100.0
Saudi Arabia	49.0	49.7	1.3	100.0
UAE	79.5	20.0	0.5	100.0
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>47.8</b>	<b>51.3</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Southern Tier</b>				
Comoros	20.8	76.9	2.3	100.0
Djibouti	29.2	67.9	2.9	100.0
Somalia	29.7	66.5	3.7	100.0
Sudan	19.3	75.8	4.9	100.0
Yemen	18.1	74.0	7.9	100.0
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>25.4</b>	<b>70.2</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>10.9</b>	<b>76.2</b>	<b>12.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Data extracted on 24 Mar 2013 11:07 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat

Arabs in the OECD by education:

Educational attainment is usually used as a proxy of skill level. As shown in Table 7 below, more than 20% of Arab migrants in the OECD countries are tertiary educated. However, the percent of tertiary education vary by country of origin; while migrants with tertiary education comprise 37.9% for GCC sub-region, it is only 15.3% for migrants from Maghreb. At the country level, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine have more than 40% tertiary educated migrants (47.3%, 41.0%, and 40.5% respectively) in the Mashreq sub-region.

Apart from the percentages, more than one million highly skilled people living in the OECD area were born in Arab countries. Algerian and Moroccan share comprise about 42%, while Egyptian share is about 15%. Hence, two-third of the highly skilled Arab migrants in the OECD countries come from three Arab countries; Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt. Adding Lebanon and Tunisia pushes the percentage up to about 85%.

**Table 7**  
**Percentage Distribution of Arab migrants in the OECD countries**  
**by Level of Education (2000)**

Country of Birth	Education level					Total number of tertiary educated expatriates
	Less than upper secondary ISCED 0/1/2	Upper secondary and postsecondary non-tertiary ISCED 3/4	Tertiary ISCED 5/6	Unknown education	All levels of education	
<b>Mashreq</b>						
Egypt	18.8	30.7	47.3	3.2	100.0	146,154
Iraq	38.9	26.9	26.6	7.6	100.0	89,185
Jordan	20.0	37.8	41.0	1.2	100.0	26,174
Lebanon	33.8	31.6	30.9	3.6	100.0	103,806
Palestine	23.5	28.2	40.5	7.9	100.0	6,283
Syria	33.0	30.3	33.3	3.4	100.0	43,336
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>30.4</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>34.9</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>414,938</b>
<b>Maghreb</b>						
Algeria	55.4	27.8	16.4	0.4	100.0	215,108
Libya	44.3	30.6	23.6	1.5	100.0	15,280
Morocco	61.1	23.1	13.9	1.8	100.0	209,436
Tunisia	55.5	27.8	15.9	0.8	100.0	68,028
Mauritania	63.1	19.1	17.2	0.6	100.0	2,613
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>57.8</b>	<b>25.7</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>510,465</b>
<b>GCC</b>						
Bahrain	15.8	40.6	40.2	3.5	100.0	2,893
Kuwait	16.7	36.9	44.2	2.2	100.0	16,401
Oman	13.6	44.6	37.5	4.4	100.0	978
Qatar	16.1	37.0	43.9	3.0	100.0	1,432
Saudi Arabia	22.8	38.8	35.8	2.6	100.0	12,209
United Arab Emirates	21.0	50.2	24.2	4.5	100.0	3,495
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>19.2</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>37.9</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>37,408</b>
<b>Southern Tier</b>						
Comoros	63.6	25.6	10.7	0.1	100.0	1,879
Djibouti	34.1	34.7	29.7	1.5	100.0	1,593
Somalia	44.0	30.6	12.5	12.9	100.0	15,658
Sudan	23.4	32.9	39.7	4.0	100.0	16,707
Yemen	47.0	30.2	19.3	3.5	100.0	6,153
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>41.8</b>	<b>30.7</b>	<b>18.9</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>41,990</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>49.6</b>	<b>27.3</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,004,801</b>

Data extracted on 24 Mar 2013 from OECD.Stat

Unemployment rates of Arab migrants in the OECD countries:

Table 8 below indicates a high level of unemployment among Arab migrants in the OECD countries. However, unemployment rates vary by country/sub-region of origin and level of education. While the overall unemployment rate was 18.3, migrants from the GCC sub-region recorded the lowest unemployment rate among all sub-regions (10.7). The highest unemployment rate was observed among Arab migrants from the Southern-Tier's sub-region (23.6). At the country level, putting aside the Southern-Tier countries with high unemployment rates except for Yemen, it is noticed that unemployment rates of the traditional sending countries to Europe have unemployment rates around 20 (19.8, 20.6, and 21.9 for Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria respectively).

As for the relationship between education and unemployment, data indicate that Arab migrants with high level of education are more employed than migrants with low or intermediate education. Unemployment rates of migrants with low education level was 24.3, compared to 17.2 for intermediate education migrants and 10.2 for migrants with high education. At the sub-region level, highly educated migrants from the GCC countries have the lowest unemployment rate (7.3) followed by migrants from the Mashreq (8.0).

**Table 8**  
**Unemployment Rates of Arab Migrants in the OECD Countries by Level of**  
**Education (2000)**

Country of Birth	Education level			
	Less than upper secondary ISCED 0/1/2	Upper secondary and postsecondary non-tertiary ISCED 3/4	Tertiary ISCED 5/6	All levels of education
<b>Mashreq</b>				
Egypt	12.9	9.7	6.5	8.3
Iraq	27.4	12.5	12.6	17.8
Jordan	12.0	8.5	6.2	7.9
Lebanon	15.3	11.0	6.9	10.4
Palestine	13.9	13.6	10.9	12.1
Syria	13.7	10.5	8.6	10.5
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>18.9</b>	<b>10.9</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>11.5</b>
<b>Maghreb</b>				
Algeria	29.0	20.3	11.7	21.9
Libya	8.0	6.9	7.4	7.6
Morocco	22.6	19.0	12.2	19.8
Tunisia	26.4	18.8	10.3	20.6
Mauritania	23.1	24.8	15.8	22.2
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>24.9</b>	<b>19.3</b>	<b>11.6</b>	<b>20.5</b>
<b>GCC</b>				
Bahrain	6.1	10.1	6.7	7.9
Kuwait	18.9	12.3	6.3	9.6
Oman	7.5	10.4	6.1	7.7
Qatar	6.0	8.6	9.2	8.3
Saudi Arabia	18.4	13.2	8.2	11.8
United Arab Emirates	18.8	17.1	10.6	14.9
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>12.9</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>10.7</b>
<b>Southern Tier</b>				
Comoros	45.4	36.1	25.7	40.8
Djibouti	37.4	23.2	16.8	24.9
Somalia	37.0	24.0	18.9	28.2
Sudan	25.1	14.8	13.9	16.2
Yemen	8.8	10.6	6.8	9.1
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>32.5</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>15.2</b>	<b>23.6</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>24.3</b>	<b>17.2</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>18.3</b>

Data extracted on 24 Mar 2013 from OECD.Stat



To sum up, Arab migrants in the OECD are older than migrants in the Arab region, their educational profile is higher and their employability vary according to education with lower unemployment rates among the highly educated migrants compared to low or medium education migrants. In Addition, they have more balanced sex composition than migrants in the Arab region.

#### ***D. International Migration Corridors***

Tables 2 and 3 present comprehensive bilateral migration matrices that illustrate the main international migration corridors within, to, and from the Arab Region. This sub section presents migration through the lens of major selected corridors.

#### **International Migration to Arab Region**

From where do migrants to Arab Region come from? As indicated in Table 9 and Figures 1a and 1b, the major migration corridor observed is India-UAE with about 2.2 million migrant followed by India Saudi Arabia corridor with about 1.5 million migrants. Egypt-Saudi Arabia and Pakistan-Saudi Arabia corridors come third with about one million for each corridor. Corridors with less than one million and more than 0.8 million migrants include Yemen-Saudi Arabia (about 894 thousand migrants) and Egypt-Jordan (about 852 thousand migrants). The Philippines-Saudi Arabia corridor has more than 0.5 million, and Eritria-Sudan has 458 thousand migrants, most of them are refugees.

The South and South East Asia-GCC countries corridor is the most prevalent corridor with millions of international migrants from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. The intra regional corridor (Arab countries-GCC countries) is the main pathway of Arab laborers from the Mashreq and Maghreb countries to the GCC countries. This corridor conveys about 25% of migrants in the GCC compared to about 75% of South and South East Asian migrants who target the GCC countries as countries of destination.

The new developments after the Arab Uprising such as the forced migration from Syria to neighboring countries are not reflected in Tables 9 and 10. Though, they are treated in another section in this report (See Section II.E for more details).

### **International Migration from Arab Region**

Where do Arab migrants go? Two distinct destinations can be identified for Arab migrants; the GCC countries (in addition to Jordan and Libya) and Europe. The GCC countries attract migrants from the Mashreq sub-region, while Europe attracts migrants from the Maghreb sub-region. In addition, North America and Oceania are destinations of Arab Migrants from both Mashreq and Maghreb.

As mentioned before, Egypt –Saudi Arabia is the most prevalent migration corridor followed by Egypt-Jordan corridor and Egypt-Libya. Less significant corridors between Iraq and Jordan, Syria and Jordan, and Sudan and Saudi Arabia are also observed. With respect to Europe, the Maghreb-Europe corridor is the most loaded pathway. Algeria-France corridor is the most loaded corridor with about 0.9 million, followed by Morocco-France, Morocco-Spain, and Morocco-Italy corridors. However, it should be noted that the stock of migrants of Maghreb origin in Europe is the outcome of historical migration to Europe after the World War II, naturalization, and the second and third generation of migrants.

**Table 9**  
**Major Destinations of Arab Migrants, 2010**

Country Of Destination	Country of Origin												
	Algeria	Comoros	Egypt	Iraq	Jordan	Lebanon	Mauritania	Morocco	Somalia	Sudan	Syria	Tunisia	Yemen
Australia			41,204	41,309		95,336				24,281			
Bahrain			34,350										
Belgium	21,550							172,682				11,128	
Canada	37,543		47,234	39,050		87,635		45,465	22,718	14,656	21,885		
Chad										38,769			
Denmark				27,057		15,372			13,230		2,271		
Djibouti									57,246				
Egypt				23,750					36,258				
Ethiopia									161,179				
France	913,794	26,951	28,024			45,455		840,985			16,224	302,363	
Germany	21,081		20,892	115,792	15,674	61,588		108,442			40,356	37,049	
Iran				379,356									
Italy	29,480		90,463					475,783				121,708	
Jordan			851,803	303,791							288,982		
Kenya									55,246	73,076			
Kuwait			319,483								122,878		
Libya			397,064									84,585	
Netherlands				35,732				167,355	13,521				
Norway				21,361					15,465				
Oman			40,711		11,642					12,626			
Qatar			87,727										
Saudi Arabia			1,005,873		172,266	58,261		20,584	27,252	279,409	111,764		894,109
Senegal							29,600						
Spain	63,346							778,451					
Sweden				103,728		24,431			17,948		19,391		
Uganda										191,103			
UAE			140,935							30,200			60,401
United Kingdom	15,612		28,102	66,612					110,326	14,134			16,568
United States			132,513	102,942	72,286	130,237		84,496	109,618	39,573	67,370		58,342
Yemen			58,037	33,442					79,466	126,109			


Source: Calculated using data from the World Bank

**Table 10**  
**Major Origin of Migrants to Arab Region, 2010**

Country Of Origin	Country of Destination										
	Bahrain	Egypt	Jordan	Kuwait	Libya	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	Sudan	United Arab Emirates	Yemen
Afghanistan								17,227			
Bangladesh			56,978	208,893		149,275		447,055		100,668	
Chad									56,660		
China			76,221								
Egypt, Arab Rep.			851,803	319,483	397,064	40,711	87,727	1,005,873		140,935	58,037
Eritrea								40,644	458,042		
Ethiopia								28,618	152,094		
India	137,402		28,974	393,210		447,824	250,649	1,452,927		2,185,919	
Indonesia			85,717					279,409			
Iran	34,350			98,302			150,389			40,267	
Iraq		23,750	303,791								33,442
Jordan								172,266			
Lebanon								58,261			
Morocco								20,584			
Nepal							175,454	18,282			
Nigeria									34,273		
Pakistan	57,251		26,776	122,878		94,993	250,649	1,005,873		453,005	
Philippines	28,625		31,627	86,015			125,324	558,818		120,801	
Somalia		36,258						27,252			79,466
Sri Lanka			102,709	208,893		40,711	87,727	391,173		161,068	
Sudan			20,766			12,626		279,409		30,200	126,109
Syria			288,982	122,878	33,326			111,764			
Thailand								23,547			
Tunisia					84,585						
Turkey								89,411			
Yemen			19,591					894,109		60,401	


Source: Calculated using data from the World Bank

**Figure 1a**  
**Top Migration Corridors to Arab Region**  
**(number of migrants, thousands)**



Source: Calculated using data from the World Bank

**Figure 1b**  
**Top Migration Corridors from Arab Region**  
**(number of migrants, thousands)**



Source: Calculated using data from the World Bank

### ***E. Refugees in the Arab Region***

The Arab region hosts about seven million refugees, most of them are Palestinians. The most recent refugee crisis in the region is the Syrian refugees crossing borders to neighboring countries. A description of major refugee population in the Arab region is given below.

#### **Palestinian Refugees:**

According to The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) figures, number of Palestinian refugees in and around the State of Palestine was 5.1 million in the beginning of 2012. Jordan hosts about 40% of Palestinian refugees (about two million), followed by Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon respectively. Refugees who live in camps comprise 29% of the total number of registered refugees. The highest percent of refugees who are living in camps is in Lebanon (50.1%), and the lowest percent is in Jordan (17.5%) (UNRWA 2012).

**Table 11**  
**Palestinian Refugees in and Around the State of Palestine\***

<b>Country/region</b>	<b>Number of Refugees</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Jordan	2,047,367	40.0
Lebanon	465,798	9.1
Syria	510,444	10.0
West Bank	874,627	17.1
Gaza Strip	1,217,519	23.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,115,755</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Calculated from: UNRWA (2012) *UNRWA in Figures 2012*," UNRWA.

\* Figures as of 1 January 2012

### Syrian Refugees:

The instability in Syria in the last two years has pushed thousands of Syrians to seek refuge in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt. According to the UNHCR statistics, the number of Syrians either registered as refugees or being assisted as such reached the one million in early March 2013. In addition, millions more are displaced internally, and thousands of people continuing to cross Syrian borders every day. The number of Syrian refugees fleeing conflict in Syria has increased dramatically since the beginning of the year. Over 400 thousand have become refugees in the first quarter of 2013 (UNHCR 2013).

Data on Syrian refugees, as shown in Table 12 below, indicate that more than 85% of them are based in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey (31.6%, 31.1%, and 23.2 respectively), while Iraq hosts 10.1%. Syrian Refugees in Egypt comprise 4.0% only. The humanitarian crisis caused by the spiking number of refugees who flee Syria increases burden on receiving countries and collaborating agencies. The Response of international and regional organizations that provide basic services for Syrian refugees is much slower than the pace at which the crisis is evolving.

**Table 12**  
**Number of Syrian Refugee in Neighboring Countries and Egypt\***

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of Refugees</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Lebanon	346,305	31.6
Jordan	258,200	31.1
Turkey	351,683	23.2
Iraq	112,945	10.1
Egypt	44,149	4.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,113,282</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Calculated from: UNHCR (2013) Syria Regional Refugee Response: Information Sharing Portal, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php> 13.03.2013

\* Numbers include registered refugees with UNHCR and those who contacted UNHCR to be registered.



**Other Refugee Population:**

Other than Palestinian and Syrian refugees, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt host a significant number of Iraqi refugees who were pushed to leave their country after the USA-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Sudan is a sending and receiving country of refugees among Arab countries. In addition, Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen host another number of Sub-Saharan African refugees who fled political instability in their countries. Refugees in the Arab receiving countries comprise a significant percent of total migrants, especially in the Arab Mashreq sub-region (Table 13).

**Table 13**

**Refugees and their Percentage to Total International Migrants in countries with  
Major stock of Refugees in the Arab Region (1990-2010)**

Country	Year				
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Egypt	1,931 (1.1)	6,275 (3.6)	6,766 (4.0)	89,568 (36.3)	92,747 (37.9)
Iraq	418 (0.5)	118,086 (88.3)	128,399 (87.4)	48,171 (37.6)	43,358 (52.0)
Jordan	929,689 (81.1)	1,289,344 (80.2)	1,571,194 (81.5)	1,946,545 (83.0)	2,527,036 (85.0)
Lebanon	305,313 (58.3)	347,591 (53.0)	379,716 (54.8)	402,425 (55.8)	462,482 (61.0)
Palestine	910,637 (100.0)	1,200,972 (100.0)	1,407,631 (100.0)	1,660,576 (100.0)	1,923,808 (100.0)
Syria	283,043 (41.0)	375,728 (46.0)	388,116 (42.0)	748,066 (56.4)	1,581,592 (71.7)
Sudan	898,838 (70.6)	701,131 (63.1)	403,025 (47.2)	144,569 (22.6)	209,458 (27.8)
Yemen	41,565 (12.1)	51,018 (13.5)	60,375 (14.6)	74,202 (16.3)	106,693 (20.6)
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,371,434</b> <b>(65.5)</b>	<b>4,090,145</b> <b>(67.3)</b>	<b>4,345,223</b> <b>(66.5)</b>	<b>5,114,123</b> <b>(68.0)</b>	<b>6,947,173</b> <b>(73.4)</b>

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008).

### ***F. Demographic Impact of International Migration***

The impact of migration on population trends and structure is well known. Since most migrants are in the working age, international migration distorts age structure of both sending and receiving countries. In the case of migration to the Arab region and the high percent of male migrants, migration affects the sex ratio of the working age population. In addition, especially in the case of migration to the GCC countries, international migration affects the population composition of the receiving countries and makes for the appearance of nationals as a minority in their own countries.

Table 14 presents international migrants as a percent of total residents in the Arab region. International migrants in the region comprise 9.1% of the total population of the region; three times the percent of migrants worldwide. However, the percent of international migrants compared to the total population in the GCC countries is 38.6% of the total population. Within this sub-region, lies Qatar with the highest percent of expatriate population worldwide (86.6) followed by UAE and Kuwait (70.0% and 68.7% respectively).


**Table 14**  
**Percent of International Migrants to Total Population in the Arab Region (1990-2010)**

Sub-Region/ Country	Year				
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
<b>Mashreq</b>					
Egypt	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3
Iraq	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.3
Jordan	35.2	37.4	39.7	42.1	45.9
Lebanon	17.6	18.8	18.4	17.7	17.8
Palestine	42.3	45.9	44.7	44.1	43.6
Syria	5.4	5.6	5.6	6.9	9.8
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>5.3</b>
<b>Maghreb</b>					
Algeria	1.1	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.7
Libya	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.4	10.4
Morocco	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Tunisia	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3
Mauritania	4.7	5.2	2.4	2.2	2.9
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.3</b>
<b>GCC</b>					
Bahrain	35.1	35.6	36.8	38.2	39.1
Kuwait	74.0	63.2	67.3	69.2	68.7
Oman	23.0	26.8	26.0	25.4	28.4
Qatar	79.2	77.2	76.3	80.5	86.6
Saudi Arabia	29.2	25.3	24.7	26.8	27.8
UAE	71.3	70.6	70.6	70.0	70.0
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>37.4</b>	<b>33.5</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>36.7</b>	<b>38.6</b>
<b>Southern Tier</b>					
Comoros	3.2	2.8	2.5	2.2	2.0
Djibouti	21.8	16.9	15.1	13.7	13.0
Somalia	9.6	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2
Sudan	4.7	3.6	2.4	1.7	1.7
Yemen	2.8	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.8</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>9.1</b>

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008).

Given the fact that most of international migrants in the GCC sub-region are in the working age, migration affects the age and sex composition of these countries dramatically. The distortion of age and sex structure de to migration is presented in Figure 2 below. The figure presents data on citizens and expatriates of the United Arab Emirates 2005 by age and sex in a population pyramid. It is clear from the table the effect of migration on age and sex structure of the population. Citizens appear to be a minority compared to expatriates, especially in the working age. The figure also reflects the masculine nature of migration to the UAE.

**Figure 2**  
**Population pyramid of citizens and expatriates, UAE 2005**  
**(Numbers)**



## **G. Undocumented and Transit Migration**

“There is a clear contradiction between the needs of developed countries to have migrant workers to support growth and the restrictive approaches to regulate migratory flows. The result of this contradiction is the creation of a large population of undocumented migrants living outside the law in host countries” (Alonso, 2011:39). In the last two decades, undocumented migration from North Africa to Europe has increased and undocumented migration networks grew, especially from Morocco to Spain across the Straits of Gibraltar and from Tunisia and Libya to the nearby Italian coasts and islands across the Mediterranean. Statistically speaking and due to the clandestine nature of this movement of people, accurate figures of the numbers involved are difficult to estimate. Although the governments of sending countries set measures to stop undocumented migration, they can not eradicate it completely. Similarly, the governments of host countries in Europe can not stop the movements of undocumented migration with high rates of success due to the complicated nature of this phenomenon and its linkages to policy and socioeconomic conditions in the sending and receiving countries.

The current stream of North African irregular migration to Europe includes fresh graduates and poorly-educated unemployed youth engaged in undocumented migration to Europe either through the Mediterranean Sea via Libya or by over staying touristic Schengen visas. This new type of migration can be attributed to two main reasons; unemployment and geographical proximity. The increasing severity of unemployment in North Africa is one of the main push factors that stimulate a strong undocumented migration stream to Europe. In addition, geographical proximity and the ease of travelling to Libya where most of the boat journeys to Europe are originated increase the incidence of undocumented migration.

### ***G. Female Migration***

Globally, the percentage of females among international migrants has remained at about 50% in the last two decades. In developed countries, female migrants accounted for about 52% of all international migrants, while in developing countries females' share was about 45%. The Arab region has one of the lowest percent of women among international migrants. Current estimates indicate that only 36.4% of international migrants in the Arab

region are females. Eight Arab countries have a percent of female migrants below the region's average. They include Iraq, Libya and the six GCC Countries, with Oman having the lowest percent of female migrants (20.8%).

**Table 15**  
**Percent of Women among International Migrants in the Arab Region**  
**(1990-2010)**

Sub-Region/ Country	Year				
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
<b>Mashreq</b>					
Egypt	47.1	47.0	46.8	46.7	46.6
Iraq	33.3	32.2	31.1	31.1	31.1
Jordan	48.8	48.9	49.0	49.1	49.2
Lebanon	48.8	48.9	49.0	49.1	49.2
Palestine	48.8	48.9	49.0	49.1	49.2
Syria	48.7	48.8	48.8	48.9	49.0
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>48.4</b>	<b>48.3</b>	<b>48.4</b>	<b>48.6</b>	<b>48.8</b>
<b>Maghreb</b>					
Algeria	45.2	45.2	45.2	45.2	45.2
Libya	35.5	35.5	35.5	35.5	35.5
Morocco	50.4	50.3	50.1	49.9	49.7
Tunisia	50.2	49.7	49.6	49.5	49.3
Mauritania	41.8	41.9	42.0	42.1	42.2
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>40.6</b>	<b>40.4</b>	<b>39.8</b>	<b>39.5</b>	<b>39.3</b>
<b>GCC</b>					
Bahrain	28.5	29.8	30.8	31.9	32.9
Kuwait	39.0	31.3	32.5	30.0	30.0
Oman	21.0	20.9	20.8	20.8	20.8
Qatar	25.8	25.8	25.8	25.8	25.8
Saudi Arabia	29.9	29.5	33.2	30.1	30.1
UAE	33.1	29.5	28.0	27.7	27.4
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>31.4</b>	<b>29.0</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>28.9</b>	<b>28.7</b>
<b>Southern Tier</b>					
Comoros	52.3	52.5	52.8	53.1	53.3
Djibouti	47.4	47.3	47.1	46.5	45.9
Somalia	47.4	47.3	47.1	46.5	45.9
Sudan	48.6	48.5	48.4	48.3	48.2
Yemen	38.3	38.3	38.3	38.3	38.3
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>46.8</b>	<b>46.1</b>	<b>45.3</b>	<b>44.5</b>	<b>44.4</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>38.2</b>	<b>37.1</b>	<b>37.6</b>	<b>36.2</b>	<b>36.4</b>

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008).



### **III. MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT**

The relationship between migration and development is complex. While, migration implies a change of place of usual residence and development means growth and better living conditions, assessing the relationships between these two concepts is not an easy task (Skeldon, 1997). The relationships between migration and development are usually explored through assessing the impact of migrants' remittances – mainly remittances of international migrants – applying economic theories of migration since Ravenstein's laws of migration (1885, 1889) until the latest economic theories of migration such as the "new economics of migration" (Stark, 1991), passing through Lee's theory of migration (Lee, 1966), the dual economy model of development and migration introduced by Lewis (1954), later extended by Fei and Ranis (1961), and the work of Todaro and Harris in this domain (Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970).

Theoretical models were proposed to assess the relationship between migration and development (see for example Fischer, et al, 1997), however empirical studies reveal different impacts of migration on development depending on the type of movement (permanent versus temporary and circulation), effects of remittances, and the stage of development in origin. Other factors related to the interrelationships between migration and development such skill transfer by migrants to their origin and opening business channels between origin and destination received less attention in the migration literature than remittances.

#### ***A. Remittances***

In 2011, the top 20 recipients of remittances in the world included three Arab countries: Egypt, Lebanon and Morocco. Remittances to these three countries amounted for more than 29US\$ billion (14.3, 7.6, and 7.3US\$ for Egypt, Lebanon, and Morocco respectively). Major receiving countries in the Arab region received more than 43US\$ billion.

### ***Remittances Inflow***

Despite some slight fluctuations, the trend in remittances to major receiving countries in the Arab region is increasing; remittances to Egypt increased dramatically from 2.9US\$ in 2000 to 14.3US\$ in 2011. The same trend can be observed in Lebanon and morocco where remittances to Lebanon increased from 2.5US\$ billion in 2002 to 7.6US\$ in 2011, while remittances to Morocco increased from 2.2US\$ in 2000 to 7.3US\$ in 2011 (See Table 16 below for more details).

**Table 16**  
**Migrant Remittance Inflows (US\$ million) to Major Receiving Arab Countries,**  
**2000-2011**

Year	Country									
	Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Sudan	Syria	Tunisia	Palestine	Yemen
2000	790	2,852	1,845	..	2,161	641	180	796	1,010	1,288
2001	670	2,911	2,011	..	3,261	740	170	927	1,066	1,295
2002	1,070	2,893	2,143	2,544	2,877	978	135	1,070	1,036	1,294
2003	1,750	2,961	2,201	4,743	3,614	1,224	889	1,250	572	1,270
2004	2,460	3,341	2,330	5,591	4,221	1,403	855	1,431	638	1,283
2005	2,060	5,017	2,500	4,924	4,590	1,016	823	1,393	705	1,283
2006	1,610	5,330	2,883	5,202	5,451	1,179	795	1,510	928	1,283
2007	2,120	7,656	3,434	5,769	6,730	1,769	1,150	1,716	1,085	1,322
2008	2,202	8,694	3,794	7,181	6,895	3,100	1,400	1,977	1,228	1,411
2009	2,059	7,150	3,597	7,558	6,270	2,135	1,550	1,964	1,210	1,160
2010	2,044	12,453	3,641	7,619	6,423	1,420	2,079	2,063	1,545	1,526
2011	1,942	14,324	3,453	7,612	7,256	1,420	2,079	2,004	1,545	1,404

Source: Extracted from the World Bank Remittances Inflow Data, November 2012.

### ***Remittances Outflow***

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been a major source of workers' remittances. Remittances from the GCC countries and Libya in the last few years were more than remittances from the United States, the prime sources of remittances worldwide. While the average annual remittances from the United States amounted for about 52USD billion in 2009, 2010, and 2011, remittances from 64.9, 68.5, and 73.7USD billion in the same years. Saudi Arabia ranked second after the United States in 2009 and 2010 and ranked third, after the United States and Switzerland in 2011 with 26.5, 27.1, and 28.5USD billion in 2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively (See Table 17 below).

With respect to the proportional share of remittances originated from the region, one can notice that remittances from Saudi Arabia comprise 38.6% of remittances, followed by Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar (16.0%, 15.2%, and 14.0% respectively). Remittances from these four countries comprise 83.8% of total remittances. Remittances from Libya have decreased sharply from 1.6USD billion in 2010 to 0.65USD billion in 2011. This may be attributed to the instability that followed the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in February 2011.

Comparing remittances originated from the GCC countries and Libya with the stock of migrants in 2010 gives an estimate of remittances per capita. It is noticed from the data that the highest remittances per capita is found in Oman (6,904US\$), followed by Qatar and Kuwait (6,222 and 5,612US\$ respectively), while the lowest per capita is found in Libya (2,358US\$). However, these estimates should be regarded as rough estimates since they undermine the variations in the percent of informal remittances, and the error that may be embedded in the estimation of the stock of migrants.

**Table 17**  
**Migrant Remittance from the GCC Countries and Libya 2000-2011 (US\$ million),**  
**and Per Capita Remittances 2010 ((US\$)**

Year	Country							Total
	Bahrain	Kuwait	Libya	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE	
2000	1,013	1,734	463	1,451	.....	15,390	.....	.....
2001	1,287	1,785	683	1,532	.....	15,120	.....	.....
2002	872	1,926	786	1,602	.....	15,854	.....	.....
2003	1,082	2,144	676	1,672	.....	14,783	.....	.....
2004	1,120	2,404	975	1,826	.....	13,555	.....	.....
2005	1,223	2,648	914	2,257	.....	14,315	.....	.....
2006	1,531	3,183	945	2,788	.....	15,964	.....	.....
2007	1,483	9,764	762	3,670	4,469	16,447	.....	.....
2008	1,774	10,323	964	5,181	5,368	21,697	.....	.....
2009	1,391	11,749	1,361	5,316	7,093	26,470	9,529	<b>64,918</b>
2010	1,642	11,770	1,609	5,704	8,123	27,069	10,564	<b>68,491</b>
2011	2,050	11,770	650	7,215	10,311	28,475	11,217	<b>73,699</b>
%	(2.8)	(16.0)	(0.9)	(9.8)	(14.0)	(38.6)	(15.2)	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Per Capita Remittances 2010</b>	<b>5,205</b>	<b>5,612</b>	<b>2,358</b>	<b>6,904</b>	<b>6,222</b>	<b>3,714</b>	<b>3,208</b>	

Source: Source: Extracted from the World Bank Remittances Inflow Data, November 2012. Data on remittance outflow Qatar and UAE is computed from the National Central Banks Annual reports.

### *Transaction Costs and Informal Remittances*

Transferring remittances to migrants' origin can be expensive relative to the often low incomes of migrant workers and the rather small amounts they may send. The cost of remittances transfer vary costs vary according to the transfer channel (banking systems, money transfer companies, or official post office services), in addition to the amount of money transferred, the transfer channels in the sending and receiving countries, the length of the conversion period, and the laws of foreign currency in the receiving country.

Despite the new technologies that made for decreasing the cost of remittance transfer, the cost of transfer to Arab region is still high, especially transfers from Europe and the United State. While the average global cost of remittance transfer is estimated at a level of 8.96% in the third quarter of 2012 (World Bank 2012), the level is way above the

global average in Germany-Lebanon, France-Algeria, Germany-Morocco, France-Tunisia corridors. However, the cost of intra regional transfers, mainly transfers from the GCC countries to other Arab countries is way lower than the global average with the lowest transfer cost in the Saudi Arabia-Yemen's corridor (2.96%) (See Table 18 for more details).

**Table 18**  
**Cost of Remittances Transfer by Selected Corridors in the Arab Region, Third Quarter of 2012**

Corridor	Cost of Transfer (% of amount of money transferred)
Germany-Lebanon	16.51
France-Algeria	14.18
Germany-Morocco	13.93
France-Tunisia	12.10
France-Morocco	11.00
USA-Lebanon	10.88
Italy-Morocco	8.03
Netherlands-Morocco	7.64
Spain-Morocco	6.85
Belgium-Morocco	6.43
Saudi Arabia-Egypt	4.73
Saudi Arabia-Jordan	4.73
UAE-Egypt	4.06
Saudi Arabia-Yemen	2.96

Source: Extracted online using World Bank data. <http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org> online data 27 Dec. 2012

Among other reasons, the high cost of remittance transfer opens the door for informal remittances. Informal remittances include money and in-kind transfers which occur through private, unrecorded channels. Such private transfers include remittances brought home by friends, relatives and even the migrants themselves. Strict monetary policies and exchange rates in the sending and receiving countries, in addition to banking systems structure geographical proximity lead a significant percent of migrants to transfer their

saving through informal channels such as *hawala*<sup>1</sup>, such as the case of the Horn of Africa, sending money with friends and relatives, such as the case of Libya and Egypt, or just bringing the money with migrants themselves in their visits or return to home countries.

The level of informal remittances is virtually unknown because they tend to flow through unrecorded channels. A study by Freund and Spatafora (2005) suggests that informal remittances amount to 35 to 75 percent of formal remittances to developing countries. Applying Freund and Spatafora's estimates to formal remittances to major receiving countries in the Arab region may push the total amount of remittances from 43US\$ billion to an amount between 58 and 75UD\$ billion.

### ***Impact of Remittances***

The importance of remittances varies across countries and regions. They play a significant role in smoothing consumption and hence contribute to poverty reduction and improving social conditions. Additionally, they can provide capital to small and microenterprises, aiding job creation (African Development Bank, et. al. 2012).

### **Impact at the micro-level**

The majority of the existing studies on the impact of remittances have shown positive impact of remittances on migrants' households. Remittances are used to cover the initial cost of migration and directly contribute to household income and increase expenditure on education and health (United Nations 2011). The use of remittances in developing countries follows a universal pattern; remittances are basically used to satisfy the basic needs of migrants' household, then consumption on education and health. After satisfying the basic needs and the initial cost of migration, migrants' families utilize remittances in improving housing conditions, building a new house or buying agricultural land. Remittances are used also to cover marriage expenses of family members. Investment or starting a business usually comes after the previously mentioned expenditure items.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Hawala* is an informal value transfer system based on the performance and honor of a huge network of money brokers, which are primarily located in the Middle East, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian subcontinent. It is basically a parallel or alternative remittance system that exists or operates outside of, or parallel to traditional banking or financial channels.

This pattern of remittances utilization can be observed in most of Arab remittance receiving countries. In Egypt, for example, research on the use of remittances has shown that 75% of remittances are used for daily expenses of households such as food and health care (Zohry, 2007). Utilization of remittances in investment and business ranges between 5% in Morocco and 18% in Tunisia (Fares, 2006). Only a small percentage of remittances are used for “productive investments”, i.e. for activities with multiplier effects in terms of income and employment creation. Hence, the high percentage of remittances used to satisfy immediate consumption and the basic needs of migrants’ families indicates the importance of migration and remittances in poverty alleviation and improving living conditions of families in the countries of origin.

### **Impact at the macro-level**

With respect to remittances as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the receiving countries in the Arab region, it is noticed that remittances are a major asset of the economies of Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt. Remittances to these countries constitute a significant share of their GDP; remittances to these countries comprise 18%, 12%, 7.2%, and 6.2% of the GDP of these countries respectively (See Table 19 below for more details).

**Table 19**  
**Remittances as a Share of GDP in some Major Receiving Countries**  
**in the Arab Region , 2011**

Country	Remittances as a share of GDP, 2011 (%)
Lebanon	18.0
Jordan	12.0
Morocco	7.2
Egypt	6.2
Tunisia	4.4
Yemen	4.2
Sudan	2.6
Algeria	1.0

Source: Extracted from the World Bank Remittances Inflow Data, November 2012.

Recorded remittances in 2010 to major receiving countries in the Arab Region indicates that remittances were nearly 21 times the amount of official development aid in Egypt, 17 times in Lebanon, 15 times in Syria, 10 times in Algeria, *six* times in Morocco, and *four* times in Tunisia. With respect to foreign direct investment, remittances in the same year amounted for 10 times in the State of Palestine, *five* times in Morocco, and *two* times in Egypt and Jordan.



**Table 20**  
**Remittances to some Arab Countries compared to Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 2010**

Country	ODA	FDI	Remittances	% of remittances to ODA	% of remittances to FDI
Algeria	198.3	2,331.0	2,044.0	1030.7	87.7
Egypt	592.4	6,385.6	12,453.0	2102.1	195.0
Jordan	954.5	1,650.8	3,641.0	381.5	220.6
Lebanon	447.9	4,279.9	7,619.0	1700.9	178.0
Morocco	992.5	1,240.6	6,423.0	647.1	517.7
Sudan	2,075.5	...	1,420.0	68.4	
Syria	135.0	1,469.2	2,079.0	1540.0	141.5
Tunisia	550.4	1,334.5	2,063.0	374.8	154.6
Palestine	2,518.7	153.6	1,545.0	61.3	1005.6
Yemen	664.2	...	1,526.0	229.7	

Source: compiled from the World Bank online database.

### ***B. Skill Transfer***

“Although remittances are an important factor in the migration and development nexus in all developing regions, migrants contribute in many different ways to their home societies,” (United Nations 2012: 14). One form of the contribution of migrants to their origin is the transfer of skills they acquired in destination to their origin. In some Arab countries, such as Morocco and Tunisia, there is evidence that skilled migration is causing shortages of qualified labor in certain sectors or a drain on scarce qualified resources, such as the case of Lebanon (Martín, 2009). Hence, skill transfer by migrants to their origin may, partially, substitute the drained brains to the destination countries.

Despite the existence of more than one million highly qualified Arab migrants in the OECD countries, comprising about 20% of Arab migrants (See Table 7 above), it seems that Arab countries did not manage to get benefit of this large number of their skilled migrants. Some Arab countries have made efforts in to link their skilled expatriates with their origin such as Forum International des Compétences Marocaines (FINCOME) à l'étranger in Morocco which aims to involve the Moroccan community residing abroad

in the development of their origin and creating a database of the highly skilled Moroccan expatriates. Another initiative is the Palestinian program aiming at creating a network of Palestinian Scientists and Technologists Abroad (PALESTA). Though, the impact of such initiatives is limited. Arab countries should focus on networking and linking the highly-skilled Arabs abroad to their associated national organizations and research centers (League of Arab States 2008).

### *C. Migration and the MDGs*

“Despite its growing scope and magnitude, [international migration] does not feature prominently in the original framework of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The relationship between migration and the MDGs has not been widely explored, although both the migration and development communities are becoming increasingly aware of the link between international migration and development.” (Usher 2005:5). Despite the absence of statistical evidence, through remittances, skill, and knowledge transfer, migration contribute to poverty reduction in origin. Moreover, as for the gender equality goal, migration contributes to this goal by empowering the left behind women through being involved in family care outside home and managing the remittances sent to them (Louhichi, 1995; Hadi, 2001). In addition, women comprise about 50% of international migration and they assume a significant role in international migration which enables them to acquire knowledge and skills in destination that in return enhance their role in the society.

Through remittances and knowledge gained by migrants, nutrition and health standards of millions of families are enhanced. Remitted money spend on health is expected to decrease child morbidity and mortality as well as improving maternal health. However, healthcare systems in countries of origin can be affected by the migration of skilled health workers from developing countries. In addition, migration affects education positively through making available resources to be spent on education. Moreover, migrants tend to enhance their housing conditions and use remittances to relocate in

better houses than their houses before migration which affect positively affects their material life and contribute to enhanced environment.

Moreover, concerning migrants and the MDGs, It should be noted that migrants play also a major role in achieving the MDGs by the investments and the many actions in their region/town/village of origin (entrepreneurship; establishing health facilities, contribution to educational facilities, etc.).

## IV. MIGRATION POLICIES

Given the fact that the Arab region is a sending, receiving, and a transit region, migration policies vary widely from one country to another. In receiving countries, policies are geared towards regulating migration inflow, while policies in sending countries are geared towards regulating emigration, linking emigrants to their home country, and protecting their rights in host countries. Transit countries usually attempt to minimize hazards associated with transit migration, human rights violations, and national sovereignty.

### *A. Summary of State Policies*

The diverse migration policies in the Arab region are summarized in Table 12 below using data compiled by the United Nations (United Nations 2012). The data is available for all Arab countries except the State of Palestine. A summary of migration policies in the region is given below.

#### **Government views and policies on immigration**

In 2011, 11 Arab countries were satisfied with their immigration level while 10 countries regard immigration levels as “too high.” Five GCC countries are of the Arab countries that regard their immigration level as too high; they are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE while only Oman regards its immigration level as satisfactory. Out of the GCC sub-region, Jordan, Algeria, Libya, Djibouti, and Yemen regard their immigration level as too high. With respect to policies, *eight* countries wished to maintain their current level of immigration (Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, and Sudan), while *three* countries did not intervene to change it (Tunisia, Comoros, and Somalia). In addition, 10 countries wished to lower their immigration level.

### **Permanent Settlement and Temporary workers**

At the Arab region level<sup>2</sup>, 10 countries desired to maintain the current level of admission of permanent settlers or did not intervene, while *six* countries wanted lower it. With respect to temporary workers<sup>3</sup>, *eight* Arab countries wished to maintain the number of temporary migrants already present in their countries or did not intervene in this regard. Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Djibouti, Yemen, and the GCC countries, except the UAE, wished to reduce the number of temporary migrants in their countries.

### **Highly skilled migrants**

Generally speaking, migration policies are biased towards the admission of the highly skilled international migrants. In 2011, all Arab countries<sup>4</sup> reported promoting the admission of highly skilled workers (maintaining the current level of admission or raising it), except Bahrain and Jordan. Jordan is a major destination of low-skilled and semi-skilled migrants from Egypt, Syria, and South and South East Asia. At the same time, The Jordanian outflow is composed of highly skilled nationals who mainly migrate to the GCC countries. The long-term ramifications of such migration streams from and to Jordan may affect the skill composition of the Jordanian labor force towards might reducing the level of the overall skills of the labor force.

### **Family reunification**

Most receiving countries allow migration for family reunification under specific conditions. Receiving countries in the GCC sub-region put a salary ceiling on workers who are allowed to bring their family with them (Shah 2007). Among the 16 Arab countries having information on policies on immigration for family reunification in 2011, 12 countries wished to maintain current level of immigration for family reunification, *two* countries with no intervention, *one* country (Oman) wished to raise immigration for that purpose, while *one* country (UAE) wished to lower immigration for family reunification purposes.

---

<sup>2</sup> Data is available for 16 countries.

<sup>3</sup> Data is available for 19 countries.

<sup>4</sup> Data is available for 17 countries.

As for Arabs in the OECD countries, the recent increase in Arab immigration was mainly due to family reunification (Fargues and Fandrich 2012). The Directive no. 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification issued by the Council of the European Union on 22 September 2003 determines the conditions under which family reunification is granted. The Directive indicates that legally residing non-EU nationals can bring their spouses, under-age children and the children of their spouses to the EU State in which they are residing. Once in the EU, eligible family members receive a residence permit and obtain access to services the same as other non-EU nationals (Council of the European Union 2003).

### **Integration policies**

Integration of migrants in the Arab region is a sensitive issue due to the high volume of foreign workers in the GCC sub-region and the fear of political instability and the impact of integration on national identity. In addition, Arab countries refuse the integration of Palestinians in order to keep their right of return. Whoever, number of Arab countries that reported programmes to integrate non-citizens was *six* in 2011. At the same time, most of Arab countries allow their citizens to acquire foreign nationalities while keeping their country of origin's nationality. As for Palestinian refugees, there is no one level of integration of Palestinian refugees but different levels ranging between no integration in Lebanon and high integration in Jordan.

### **Emigration**

Number of Arab countries that considered their level of emigration as satisfactory was 13 countries. Only *five* countries regarded their emigration level as too high, while *three* other countries regarded their emigration level as too low. It seems from these figures that Arab countries are more concerned with immigration policies than emigration policies. Moreover, and with respect to policies of emigration, most of Arab countries don't intervene with policies regarding emigration; data indicate that 12 Arab countries have no intervention. In addition, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan's emigration policies aim at lowering emigration, while Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen's policies aim at raising emigration.

Most of sending countries in the Arab region don't have an explicit migration policy. Yet, the general directions of sending countries aim at encouraging emigration to ensure equilibrium in the domestic labor market and decrease unemployment rates, and maximizing economic benefits of migration through remittances (de Bel-Air, 2007; Zohry, 2009b). In addition, and with a few exceptions, sending countries don't have concrete policies or programs to tap into global demand for labor (through diversified migration, channels, or special migration programs).

### **Return migration**

With respect to encouraging the return of emigrants to their origin, many countries in the World adopt initiatives to encourage the return of skilled citizens living abroad to contribute to the development of their countries of origin. In 2011, *eight* countries had policies and programmes to encourage their citizens to return, while *nine* other countries didn't have policies and programmes to encourage their citizens to return<sup>5</sup>. However, return policy is not only about encouraging return. Measures for reintegration in the labor market and social life should be considered. For example, the available data on Egyptian return migrants indicate that return migrants have higher levels of human capital than non-migrants, and are likely to be more entrepreneurial the longer they have worked abroad (Wahba, 2007).

Acknowledging that migration policy based on the United Nations conceptualization, as reviewed in section is narrow, other policy area of relevance to international migration such employment, nationalization of the labor force, and migrants' rights and protection are discussed in the different sections of this report.

---

<sup>5</sup> Data is available for 17 countries.

**Table 12**  
**Summary of Migration Policies in the Arab region, 2011**

Country	Immigration							Emigration		
	View	Policy	Permanent settlement	Temporary workers	Highly skilled workers	Family reunification	Integration of non-citizens	View	Policy	Encouraging the Return of Citizens
<b>Mashreq</b>										
Egypt	Satisfactory	Lower	Lower	Lower	Maintain	Maintain	Yes	Too Low	Maintain	Yes
Iraq	Satisfactory	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain	...	Yes	Too High	Lower	...
Jordan	Too high	Lower	Lower	Lower	Lower	Maintain	No	Too Low	Raise	No
Lebanon	Satisfactory	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain	No	Too high	No intervention	Yes
Palestine	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Syria	Satisfactory	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain	Yes	Too high	No intervention	Yes
<b>Maghreb</b>										
Algeria	Too high	Maintain	...	Maintain	...	Maintain	...	Too high	No intervention	Yes
Libya	Too high	Lower	...	Lower	Maintain	Maintain	...	Satisfactory	Maintain	No
Morocco	Satisfactory	Maintain	Maintain	Lower	Maintain	Maintain	Yes	Too Low	Maintain	Yes
Tunisia	Satisfactory	No intervention	No intervention	No intervention	No intervention	No intervention	No	Satisfactory	Raise	No
Mauritania	Satisfactory	Maintain	No intervention	No intervention	Maintain	No intervention	...	Satisfactory	No intervention	No
<b>GCC</b>										
Bahrain	Too High	Lower	Lower	Lower	Lower	Maintain	...	Satisfactory	No intervention	...
Kuwait	Too high	Lower	Lower	Lower	Raise	Maintain	No	Satisfactory	No intervention	No
Oman	Satisfactory	Maintain	No intervention	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No	Satisfactory	No intervention	No
Qatar	Too high	Lower	No intervention	Lower	Maintain	Maintain	Yes	Satisfactory	No intervention	No
Saudi Arabia	Too high	Lower	No intervention	Lower	Maintain	Maintain	Yes	Satisfactory	Lower	Yes
UAE	Too high	Lower	Lower	Maintain	Raise	Lower	No	Satisfactory	No intervention	Yes
<b>Southern Tier</b>										
Comoros	Satisfactory	No intervention	No intervention	...	...	...	...	Satisfactory	No intervention	...
Djibouti	Too high	Lower	Lower	Lower	Maintain	Maintain	No	Satisfactory	No intervention	No
Somalia	Satisfactory	No intervention	...	...	...	...	...	Satisfactory	No intervention	...
Sudan	Satisfactory	Maintain	...	Maintain	...	...	...	Too High	Lower	Yes
Yemen	Too high	Lower	...	Lower	Maintain	...	...	Satisfactory	Raise	No

Source: Compiled from: United Nations (2012) World Population Policies 2011, United Nations, New York.



### ***B. Nationalization of the Labor force and Migration***

All GCC countries are seeking to reduce dependence on expatriate labor and working hard to replace expatriates with national employment. In order to achieve this goal, the GCC countries have adopted programs aimed at localization of jobs under different names such as Bahrainization in Bahrain, Kuwaitization in Kuwait, Omanization in Oman, Qatarization in Qatar, Saudization in Saudi Arabia, and Emiratization in the UAE. The key goal of such programs is to provide more jobs for nationals and decrease the heavy reliance on expatriate labor force in addition to preserving national identities.

Nationalization policies in the GCC sub-region are based on measures to increase the cost of hiring foreign workers through direct and indirect taxes on migrant workers, such as increasing residence permits' fees, health fees, and social insurance fees, in addition to combating visa trading and strict implementation of law. On the demand side of labor force, GCC countries make for creating job opportunities for nationals through vocational training, increasing women's participation in the labor force, providing benefits for employing nationals in the private sector, quotas on expatriates, quotas on employing nationals in selected economic sectors, and banning hiring expatriates in certain sectors (Shah 2006).

The latest naturalization intervention occurred in Saudi Arabia in 2011, where the Saudi government had developed a new system called "*Nitaqat*." The new system classifies private sector companies into color-coded bands; red and yellow colors for companies with high share of foreign workers, and green color indicates a high level of success in Saudization. The new initiative sets restrictions on hiring for companies in the red and yellow bands. Restrictions include limited term visas for foreign nationals and time constraints for hiring more Saudi nationals (Randeree, 2012). However, in light of the demographic deficit and the economic expansion witnessed in the GCC sub-region, the outcomes of the naturalization policies and programmes are not expected to make a big difference in the labor market.

However, nationalization of labor force should not be considered a matter of administrative decrees; it has to do with the structure of the economies and the segmentation of labor markets; especially public/private and national/immigrant worker. Table 13 below shows the distribution of employment in the GCC countries by Sector. Data indicate that the private sector is the main employer of expatriates, while the public sector is the main employer of nationals. While nationals represent 6.3-23.4 percent of the total number of employed persons, they only represent 1.0-17.8 percent in the private sector. Nationals' representation in the public sector ranges between 43.9 percent in Qatar to 92.2 percent of employed persons in Saudi Arabia.

**Table 13**  
**Employment in the Public and Private Sector in the GCC Countries, 2010\***

Sector	Nationality	Country				
		Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia
Public Sector	Nationals	36	220	131	61	885
	Expatriates	5	79	22	78	75
	Total	41	299	153	139	960
	<b>% Nationals</b>	<b>87.8</b>	<b>73.6</b>	<b>85.6</b>	<b>43.9</b>	<b>92.2</b>
Private Sector	Nationals	84	42	178	10	725
	Expatriates	387	1,849	956	986	6,267
	Total	471	1,891	1,134	996	6,992
	<b>% Nationals</b>	<b>17.8</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>15.7</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>10.4</b>
<b>Total employment</b>		<b>512</b>	<b>2,190</b>	<b>1,287</b>	<b>1,135</b>	<b>7,952</b>
<b>% Nationals</b>		<b>23.4</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>24.0</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>20.2</b>

Source: Calculated from Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, Gulf Investment Cooperation (2012) Employment and Unemployment in the GCC, GIC Monthly Economic Review, Kuwait.

\* UAE data is not available.

### ***C. Regional and International Cooperation on Migration***

Migration entails change of usual place of residence by relocating in another country in the same region or internationally. Hence, cooperation on migration within other countries in the same region or internationally is an important aspect of today's

international relations agenda. This section explores cooperation on migration in the Arab region.

### **Intra-regional cooperation on migration**

Early attempts to develop a regional migration policy in the Arab Region are dated back to June 1957 with the Agreement on Arab Economic Unity issued by the Arab Economic Council. In March 1965, the Arab Economic Council issued Resolution No. 77 on the freedom of movement, residence and labor, as stipulated in the Agreement on Arab Economic Unity. A set of follow up agreements, declarations, and charters has been issued. These agreements focused on freedom of mobility for Arab citizens to live and work throughout the Arab region in addition to giving Arab labor priority over non-Arabs and to simplify recruitment procedures.

Despite such agreements, data indicate that the percentage share of Arab workers in the GCC sub-region has decreased sharply from more than 70% in the 1970s to less than 25% in recent years. A major reason for this phenomenon has been the mounting competition of immigrant workers from South and South East Asia, offering even lower expectations on salaries and work conditions (Zohry, 2007). Another important reason of the increasing share of South and South East Asian workers in the GCC countries has to do with segmentation in the labor market and the effective commercialization of recruitment in Asian countries (Wickramasekera, 2002; International Labor Organization 2006).

In recent years the League of Arab States (LAS), has been involved in various activities regarding migration and Arab expatriates through its specialized departments. In the last few years, LAS organized the First Arab Expatriates Conference in December 2010 and another thematic conference on Arab Scientists Abroad in December 2012. In March 2013, LAS organized a “Regional Consultative Meeting for the Arab Region in Preparation for the Second United Nations High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development” in cooperation with the United Nations Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia (UN-ESCWA) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

**Table 14**  
**Arab Conventions, Declarations, and Charters regarding**  
**International Migration**

Convention/Declaration/Charter	Date
The Agreement on Arab Economic Unity issued by the Arab Economic Council	June 1957
The Arab Economic Council Resolution No. 77 on the Freedom of Movement, Residence and Labour, as stipulated in the Agreement on Arab Economic Unity.	March 1965
Arab Convention No. 1 issued by the Arab Labour Organisation (ALO) on the Movement of Arab Manpower	1966
Arab Convention No. 3 on the Minimum Level of Social Insurance	1971
Arab Convention No. 4 issued by the Arab Labour Organisation (ALO) on the Movement of Arab Manpower	1975
Arab Convention No. 8 relating to Trade Union Freedoms and Rights	1977
Arab Convention No. 9 on Vocational Guidance and Training	1977
The Arab Economic Council Resolution No. 784 on the Freedom of Movement of Technical Manpower among Arab States	1978
The Declaration of Principles on the Movement of Arab Manpower among Arab States	1978
Arab Convention No. 14 on the Arab Worker's Right to Social Insurance when Moving for Employment in an Arab Country	1981
Arab Convention No. 15 on Wage Determination and Protection	1983
Arab Charter on Child Rights	1993
Arab Declaration on Family Rights	1994
Cairo Declaration on Childhood	2001
Arab Charter on Human Rights	2004
The Declaration of Principles on Facilitating the Movement of Arab Manpower	2005
Arab Declaration on International Migration	2006

### **Arab-European cooperation on migration**

The cooperation between Europe and the Arab region on migration mainly involves the countries of North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean countries. This may be attributed to the geographical proximity and the established migration streams between these countries and Europe, in addition to the fact that some of these countries are considered as transit migration between other regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and South and South East Asia and Europe. The European migration policies aim at facing the demographic deficit

in Europe by adopting programmes to attract the highly skilled migrants and to curb irregular/undocumented migration.

In the last two decades, the Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995, was the founding act of a comprehensive partnership between the European Union (EU) and the countries in the Southern Mediterranean through focusing on three types of partnerships; political and security partnership, economic and financial partnership, and social, cultural and human partnership. As part of the Barcelona Process, the EU has concluded Association Agreements with Algeria (2005), Egypt (2004), Jordan (2002), Lebanon (2006), Morocco (2000) and Tunisia (1998). Two Association Agreements are still in negotiation with the State of Palestine and Syria. Three areas for cooperation on migration are addressed in the Barcelona Process and the Association Agreements; legal migration, migration and development, and irregular migration.

In addition to the Association Agreements, bilateral agreements has been concluded between EU Member States and Arab countries focusing on cooperation on migration such as the agreement between France and Tunisia and Morocco on temporary migration and coordination on fighting irregular migration. Egypt and Tunisia also have concluded bilateral agreements on temporary labor migration with Italy (International Labour Organization 2009). However, these bilateral agreements between European countries and Arab countries often provide for very limited migration for employment opportunities, which does not adequately respond to actual flows or demand (International labour Organization 2009). Moreover, “the weak position of the EU as an international actor has had a direct impact on its cooperation on migration. In many cases, it is still the Member States and their bilateral relations that can move the cooperation forward” (Weinar, 2011:14).

### **Arab-South and South East Asian cooperation on migration**

Despite the fact that about 75% of foreign workers in the GCC sub-region originate from South and South East Asia, the degree of cooperation on migration between the two entities is minimal, especially at the regional level. Except for a few bilateral agreements and the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, no regional agreements exist. The bilateral approach was

pursued by several countries. Qatar, together with the UAE, is perhaps the country with more agreements than others, having signed instruments with, among others, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam (Battistella and Khadria 2011). Bilateral agreements usually set the procedure by which applications by employers in receiving countries hire foreign workers, the conditions of employment, wages and facilities of transport and accommodation, and conditions of repatriation of workers.

The UAE held a forum with Asian labor-exporting countries in January 2008; this meeting is known as the “Abu Dhabi Dialogue.” The Abu Dhabi Dialogue, brought together for the first time the Colombo Process countries<sup>6</sup> with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, plus Yemen and two additional Asian countries of destination; Malaysia and Singapore. The Abu Dhabi Dialogue adopted the “Abu Dhabi Declaration.” The Abu Dhabi Declaration launched a collaborative approach to short-term labor mobility in Asia in order to maximize benefits for sending and receiving countries. The Declaration identified four key partnerships between Asian countries of origin and destination in order to foster information sharing, promote capacity building, technical cooperation and interstate cooperation (Abu Dhabi Dialogue 2008):

Partnership 1: Enhancing knowledge in the areas of: labor market trends, skills profiles, temporary contractual workers and remittances policies and flows and their interplay with development in the region.

Partnership 2: Building capacity for effective matching of labor demand and Supply.

Partnership 3: Preventing illegal recruitment practices and promoting welfare and protection measures for contractual workers, supportive of their well being and preventing their exploitation at origin and destination.

Partnership 4: Developing a framework for a comprehensive approach to managing the entire cycle of temporary contractual mobility that fosters the mutual interests of countries of origin and destination

---

<sup>6</sup> Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam

Hence, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue constitutes an important landmark in regional cooperation on contractual labor migration.

#### ***D. Migrants Rights and Protection***

The first thing that comes to mind when talking about expats workers in the GCC countries is the *Kafala* system (The Workers' Sponsor System). The *Kafala* system has been reported to *de facto* exist since the 1930s. It was introduced by the British with no written legal basis. The *Kafala* system requires all laborers to have an in-country sponsor, usually their employer, who is responsible for their visa and legal status. Despite the criticism of this system for creating easy opportunities for the exploitation of workers, as many employers take away passports and abuse their workers with little chance of legal repercussions, the GCC countries insists to apply this system except for Bahrain that repealed the *Kafala* system in 2009. Bahrain established a new public entity, The Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA) to be responsible for sponsoring migrant workers rather than the private employers (the sponsors). Kuwait announced that it would put an end to the *Kafala* system in February 2011, however instead changed one restriction of the applied *Kafala* system making it easier for migrant workers to change their sponsors (Migration Forum in Asia 2012).

Despite the contradiction between the *kafala* system and the human rights practices and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article no. 13 which states that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country," the GCC countries regard this system as a relevant mechanism to manage labor market and to protect their countries from a potential massive foreign labor inflow if they abolish this system (Shamsi 2006). One of the major negative impacts of the *Kafala* system on the local labor market is that some citizens in the receiving countries profit by sponsoring migrant workers they do not intend to employ. They leave them freelance in the local labor market for fees workers pay for the sponsor, usually to renew their sponsorship. In addition, facilitating the entry of abundant migrant workers, without real jobs, the *Kafala*

system allows for the segmentation of labor markets. This segmentation acts against the employment of native workers and is a cause for their unemployment.

A landmark in the international community's efforts to protect migrants is the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. The Convention was signed on 18 December 1990, it entered into force on 1 July 2003. The Convention constitutes a comprehensive international treaty regarding the protection of migrant workers' rights. The primary objective of the Convention is to foster respect for migrants' human rights and ensuring the protection of and respect for the fundamental rights of migrants. However, it is noticed that the GCC states, which host the vast majority of migrant workers in the Arab Region, have not ratified this Convention. At the level of the Arab Region, only six countries have ratified this agreement; Egypt, Morocco (1993), Libya (2004), Algeria, Syria (2005), and Mauritania in 2007. Except for Libya, all other countries are mainly sending countries.

### ***E. Migration and the Arab Uprising***

The Arab Uprising had an immediate impact on international migration in the Middle East and North Africa as reflected in the return migration from Libya, border crossing from Syria to Turkey and other neighboring countries in the region, and the slight rise in irregular migration from Tunisia right after the fall of the Ben Ali's regime. However, the immediate impact of the Arab uprising was a reaction of the fall of the regimes and the disruption of economic and political systems of these countries. Moreover, the expected changes in political and economic orientations in the countries such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen and the changing regional mosaic will have a long term impact on the overall configuration of political and economic relations within the region on the one hand and between the region and other regions that form the migration system from and to the region on the other hand.

Despite the absence of statistical evidence, and under the new regimes in the region, one may expect a close cooperation on migration management and migrants' rights between



some specific countries. It is also expected that countries that regard the Arab uprising as a threat to their political stability may take rigorous measures regarding migration flows from specific countries to their territories.

## **V. POLICY DIRECTIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD**

Due to the multifaceted migration streams in the Arab region and the complexity and diversity of socio-economic and demographic situation, a comprehensive policy on international migration is quit difficult to exist in the short run. Instead, thematic and sub-regional policies may lead to a comprehensive policy in the long run. Hence, the policy directions below are grouped by themes such as remittances, migrants' rights, and regional and sub-regional integration and cooperation.

### ***A. Remittances***

With the increasing impact of migrants' remittances on development and poverty alleviation in origin, the following recommendations may be considered to maximize the benefits and utilization of remittances:

1. Decreasing the cost of remittances' transfer through developing banking systems and increasing competition in a market dominated by two major money transfer groups (Western Union and Money Gram). These policies will increase the net amount of remittances received by migrants' families and decrease the informal remittances in the long run.
2. Introducing/developing policies and national economic incentives to encourage migrants to invest their remittances in their home countries through tax exemptions of migrants' projects, the expansion of access to financial services, and promoting collective remittances and developing programs to engage expatriates in local development.
3. Developing programs to enable microfinance institutions to provide technical assistance among remittances' receiving communities in order to maximize the utilization of remittances in development project.

### ***B. Diaspora Engagement***

Whilst abroad, expatriate nationals acquire skills that can be transferred to their origin through national programs to engage them in the development of their origin. Skill

transfer by expatriate nationals to their origin may, partially, substitute the drained brains to the destination countries. Initiatives to engage expatriate nationals are noted in some Arab countries. However, the outcomes of these initiatives are limited. Hence, the following recommendations may boost diaspora engagement in the Arab Region:

1. Evaluating existing initiatives of engaging diaspora in development in the countries of origin and adjusting these initiatives to fulfill their goals and targets
2. Strengthening the ties between specialized agencies in the countries of origin and the highly-skilled expatriates.
3. Developing and updating information systems and databases of the highly-skilled expatriate nationals.
4. Developing plans with specific objectives and means of verification of diaspora engagement through a consultative process with expatriates.

### ***C. Migrants' Rights***

With the high volume of migrant workers in the Arab region and the *Kafala* system in the GCC sub-region, the violation of migrants' rights is increasing. A few recommendations may be considered to abide with international human rights standards and practices:

1. The GCC states are urged to abolish the *kafala* system and develop another human rights-friendly mechanism to fulfill their needs of labor force. In addition, these countries should intensify their efforts to combat trading on visas.
2. Arab countries should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families as a universal umbrella to protect migrant workers and their families.
3. Sending countries in the region should make available appropriate mechanisms to protect their citizens and provide legal assistance to their migrant citizens. In addition, sending countries should establish/improve the pre-departure programs to educate their citizens regarding their rights and the available assistance whilst abroad.

#### ***D. Nationalization, Population, and the Demographic Deficit***

The GCC states should recognize the ceiling of their efforts aiming at naturalizing their labor force and set realistic programs that recognize the mismatching between their expanding economic activities and the available national labor force. Recommendations regarding naturalization and the demographic deficit in the GCC sub-region and the demographic surplus in other sub-regions are laid out below:

1. With the existing naturalization programs in the GCC sub-region, GCC states should develop plans to outsource jobs instead of insourcing migrants. With the development in technology and communications, customer service departments can be operated through call centers that can be located in the sending countries instead of the GCC states. The same mechanisms can be applied to finance and human resources departments.
2. In addition, the GCC states can move labor intensive industries to sending countries, especially if the raw materials are exported. This may apply to food production industry. Moving such industries to sending countries will reduce dependence on foreign labor, strengthen ties with sending countries through Foreign Direct Investment, in addition to getting benefit of cheap labor in destination countries.
3. As for the sending countries in the region, these countries should strengthen the competitiveness of their labor force in the international labor market and develop programs to rehabilitate their labor force to increase employability.

#### ***E. Regional Cooperation***

Despite the long list of agreements, declarations, and regional conventions that cover all aspects of human mobility in the region, the Arab region lacks a regional consultative mechanism that includes all Arab countries in order to formulate a comprehensive and integrated Arab strategy that makes for maximizing the benefits of migration and minimize its hazards and strengthens the position of Arab states in negotiating migration issues regionally and globally. Such mechanism can be facilitated by the specialized regional and sub-regional entities such as the League of Arab States, GCC Council, and

Arab Labour Organisation. A “regional policy framework”, made of regional and bilateral agreements, could be also an alternative.

#### ***F. International Cooperation***

Europe is the major receiving country of Arab migration while South and South East Asia is the Major sending region to the Arab Region. Cooperation with the two regions is guided mainly by the Colombo Process and the Abu Dhabi Declaration in the case of South and South East Asia, and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the case of Europe. However, more effort is needed in order to urge the European partners to strengthen legal migration channels and to boost cooperation on training of potential migrants from the region. As for the cooperation with South and South East Asian countries, the GCC states are urged to strengthen their ties with this important sending region and develop the appropriate mechanisms to strengthen the four areas of partnership agreed-upon in the Abu Dhabi Declaration.

#### ***G. Data Collection***

Due to the lack of comparable data on international migration in the Arab region, this study depended mainly on international data sources. Hence, it is highly recommended to make available comprehensive and up-to-date data on various dimensions of Arab migration by Arab countries through comprehensive mechanisms for collecting, analyzing, classifying, tabulating, and updating data on international migration in the Arab region.

## References

- Abu Dhabi Dialogue (2008) “Abu Dhabi Declaration of Asian Countries of Origin and Destination,” Abu Dhabi, 21-22 January.
- African Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations Development Programme, and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2012) “African Economic Outlook 2012.” Tunis.
- Al-Jalili, I. (2004) “Arab Population in the UK Study for consideration of inclusion of ‘Arab’ as an ethnic group on future census returns,” The National Association of British Arabs, London.
- Alonso, J. A. (2011) “International Migration and Development: A review in light of the crisis,” Committee for Development *Policy Background Paper* No. 11(E), ST/ESA/2011/CDP/11(E), Development Policy and Analysis Division, United Nations, New York.
- Battistella, G. and Binod Khadria (2011) “Labour Migration in Asia and the Role of Bilateral Migration Agreements: Market Access Facilitation by Informal Means,” Paper presented in *Markets for Migration and Development (M4MD): Trade and Labour Mobility Linkages - Prospects for Development*, Bern, 13-15 September.
- Boubakri, H. (2004) “Transit Migration between Tunisia, Libya and Sub Saharan Africa: Study based on Greater Tunis,” paper presented at *Regional Conference on Migrants in Transit Countries: Sharing Responsibility for management and Protection*, Istanbul, 30 September - 01 October.
- Choukri, N. (1999) “New perspectives on political economy of migration in the Middle East,” Appleyard, R. (ed.) *Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries. Volume 4: The Arab Region*. pp. 19-43, IOM and UNFPA, Geneva.
- Council of the European Union (2003) “Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the Right to Family Reunification,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 251/12.

- de Bel-Air, F. (2007) "State Policies on Migration and Refugees in Jordan," Paper Prepared for the *Workshop on Migration and Refugee Movements in the Middle East and North Africa*, The Forced Migration & Refugee Studies Program, The American University in Cairo, Cairo, October 23-25.
- Fares, M. L. (2006) "Remittances of labour migrants in the Arab region: characteristics and impact," Paper presented in the *Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region*, Beirut, 15-17 May. (E/ESCWA/SDD/2006/W.G1/3).
- Fargues, P. and C. Fandrich (2012) "Migration after the Arab Spring," *MPC Research Report 2012/09*, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence.
- Fei, J.C.H. and Ranis, G. (1961): "A Theory of Economic Development," *American Economic Review*, 51: 533–65.
- Freund, C. & Spatafora, N. (2005) "Remittances : transaction costs, determinants, and informal flows," *Policy Research Working Paper Series 3704*, The World Bank.
- Global Commission on International Migration (2005): *Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action*. Report of the Global Commission on International Migration, 5 October.
- Hadi, A. (2001) "International migration and the change of Women's position among the left-behind in rural Bangladesh," *International Journal of Population Geography*, 7:53-61.
- International Labour Organization (2006) "Facts on Labour Migration in Asia," *Fourteenth Asian Regional Meeting*, Busan, 29 August - 1 September.
- International Labour Organization (2009) "International labour migration and employment in the Arab region: Origins, consequences and the way forward," Thematic Paper, *Arab Employment Forum*, Beirut 19–21 October.
- Kapiszewski, A. (2006) "Arab Versus Asian migrant Workers," Paper presented in the *Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region*, Beirut, 15-17 May. (E/ESCWA/SDD/2006/W.G1/3).

- League of Arab States (2008) *Arab Labor Migration Report: Brain Drain, Bleeding or Opportunities?* Cairo.
- Lee, E.S. (1966): "A theory of migration", *Demography*, 3(1): 47–57.
- Lewis, W.A. (1954): "Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor", *The Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies*, 22(2): 139–91.
- Louhichi, K. (1995) "Migration and women's status: the case of Jordan," *International Migration*, 33(2):235-250.
- Martín, I. (2009) "Labour Markets Performance and Migration Flows in Arab Mediterranean Countries. A Regional Perspective," *Labour Markets Performance and Migration Flows in Arab Mediterranean Countries: Determinants and Effects*, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, Florence.
- Migration Forum in Asia (2012): "Reform of the Kafala (Sponsorship) System," *Policy Brief No. 2*.
- OECD (2013) *Database on Immigrants in OECD countries*, OECD. <http://www.oecd.org/els/databaseonimmigrantsinoecdcountriesdioc.htm> 21.03.2013.
- Qatar Statistics Authority (2010) *The General Census of Population and Housing, and Establishment 2010*, Doha.
- Randeree, Kasim (2012) "Workforce Nationalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council States," *Occasional Paper No. 9*, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar.
- Ravenstein, E.G. (1885): "The laws of migration", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 48(2): 167–277.
- Ravenstein, E.G. (1888): "The laws of migration", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 52(2): 241–301.
- Shah N.M. (2007). *Migration to Kuwait: Trends, Patterns and Policies*, AUC, Cairo
- Shamsi, M. (2006) "Evaluation of labour immigration policies in the GCC: lessons for the future", Paper presented to the *Expert Group Meeting on International*



*Migration and Development in the Arab Region* (Beirut, 15-17 May)  
(E/ESCWA/SDD/2006/W.G1/3).

Skeldon, R. (1997): *Migration and Development: A Global Perspective*. Longman, London.

Stark, O. (1991): *The Migration of Labor*, Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.

Todaro, M.P. (1969): "A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries", *American Economic Review*, 59: 138–48.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2013) *Report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem*, Twenty-second session, Agenda item 7, Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, Human Rights Council, New York .

United Nations (1995) *ICPD Programme of Action*, New York: United Nations.

United Nations (2006) "International Migration in the Arab Region," Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, United Nations, *Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region: Challenges and Opportunities*, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs Beirut, Lebanon 15-17 May

United Nations (2011) *Impact of remittances on Poverty in Developing Countries*, United Nations, New York and Geneva.

United Nations (2012) *International Migration from a Regional and interregional Perspective*, United Nations, New York

United Nations (2012) *World Population Policies 2011*, United Nations, New York.

UNHCR (2013) *Press Release*, 6 March, UNHCR, Geneva

UNRWA (2012) *UNRWA in Figures 2012*," UNRWA.

- Wahba, J. (2007). "Returns of overseas work experience: The case of Egypt." In: Özden Ç. and Schiff M., eds. *International Migration, Economic Development and Policy*. World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan: 235–258, Washington (DC) and London.
- Weinar, A. (2011) "EU Cooperation Challenges in External Migration Policy," *Research Report, Background paper, EU-US Immigration Systems 2011/02*, European University Institute, Florence.
- Wickramasekera, P. (2002) "Asian Labour Migration: Issues and Challenges in an Era of Globalization," *International Migration Papers* no. 57, International Labour Office, Geneva.
- World Bank (2012) *Remittance Prices worldwide*, Issue No. 4. The World Bank, Washington D.C.
- Zohry, A. (2006) "Egyptian Youth and the European Eldorado: Journeys of Hope and Despair", *Working Paper No. 18*, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen.
- Zohry, A. (2007) "Migration and Development in Egypt," Project Group Meeting on *Migration as a Potential and Risk - Europe and the MENA Region*, Osnabruck University and Robert Bosch Foundation, Berlin, Germany, 16-17 December.
- Zohry, A. (2009a) "The Migratory Patterns of Egyptians in Italy and France," *CARIM Research Report no. 2009/17*. The Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM), European University Institute, Florence.
- Zhory, A. (2009b) "The Impact of the Current Economic Crisis on Egyptian Migration and Egyptians Abroad." The Egyptian Society for Migration Studies, Cairo.